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I. Introduction
Tatyana Vladimirova Basova, a native and citizen of Russia,
arrived in the United States in 1994.1 While in her home country,
Ms. Basova was a victim of repeated abduction and rape by the
Chechen Mafia for a period of more than two-and-a-half years.2
She even became pregnant from the rapes and faced the decision
of aborting the pregnancy.3 Each time her attackers allowed her to
go home, they threatened her and told her to remain silent about
the rapes and abductions.4 Her parents attempted to receive help
from local authorities who refused to intervene, expressing concern
about a potential conflict with the Mafia, given its strength and
political influence.5 Upon Basova’s departure from Russia, the
Mafia burned down her parents’ cottage and threatened to kill her
if she ever returned.6
Basova sought asylum in the United States and was denied by
the immigration court, by the Board of Immigration Appeals, and
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals because—although she was
found to have been persecuted—her persecution did not fall into
the statutory categories of race, religion, political opinion,
nationality, or membership in a particular social group. 7 Basova
was ordered removed from the United States.8 The rest of her story
is unknown.
1. See Basova v. I.N.S., No. 98-9540, 1999 WL 495640, at *1 (10th Cir. 1999)
(explaining Basova’s background and experiences).
2. Id. (describing Basova’s path to her asylum application).
3. Id. at *3 (explaining the extent of her persecution).
4. Id. (describing the threats Basova received).
5. Id. (stating that the Chechen mafia was essentially a
quasi-governmental entity).
6. Id. (explaining that the persecution continued even after she left Russia).
7. See id. (“[W]e cannot rewrite the law or force the INS to permit asylum
under these circumstances.”).
8. See id. (“Because Ms. Basova cannot establish her entitlement to asylum,
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Basova’s experience with American immigration law is not
particularly unique.9 This is because the prevailing interpretation
of asylum law in the United States does not allow for asylum
claims on the basis of gender.10 Currently, an individual seeking
asylum must establish that they meet the definition of “refugee” in
that race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in
a particular social group was one central reason for their
persecution.11 Because gender is absent from the categories listed,
applicants like Basova must try to fit their asylum claim into one
of the enumerated grounds, and are regularly met with denial.12
Victims of gender-based persecution most commonly try to
mold their asylum claims to fit under the fifth category,
“membership in a particular social group.”13 This category is
notably vague, rendering it a potential “catch-all” for claims that
do not fall within the other categories.14 Claims based on gender
have not been particularly successful, and in 2018, former
Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued an opinion in Matter of
A-B-15 attempting to foreclose the opportunity for successful
she cannot satisfy the more stringent standard required for withholding of
removal.”).
9. See, e.g., R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917 (B.I.A. 2001) (denying asylum to
a Guatemalan woman who was raped, sodomized, and brutally beaten by her
husband).
10. See Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Possession of
broadly-based characteristics such as youth or gender will not by itself endow
individuals with membership in a particular group.”).
11. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (articulating that for an applicant
to establish being a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), the applicant must
establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecution).
12. See Valerie Plant, Honor Killings and the Asylum Gender Gap, 15 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 109, 118 (2005) (“Many cases necessarily framed in
gender-related terms have met with failure.”).
13. See Danette Gomez, Last in Line – The United States Trails Behind in
Recognizing Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 959, 965 (2003)
(explaining the best chance of success for victims of gender-based persecution).
14. See Plant, supra note 12, at 118 (“A ‘Particular Social Group,’ as a
category, was never defined in the United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees or in the Refugee Act of 1980, which has allowed it to be a
malleable catch-all . . . .”).
15. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (AG 2018) (holding that victims of private
violence will not be eligible for asylum and countries’ problems policing certain
crimes does not establish asylum eligibility).
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asylum applications from victims of
complicating gender-based claims further.16

domestic

violence,

A. Roadmap for the Future
This Note analyzes asylum law’s lack of explicit protection for
individuals who suffer persecution based on their gender, and the
reluctance of immigration courts to grant asylum for claims
centered on the applicant’s gender. This Note explores
opportunities for relief from removal for gender-based asylum
claims under the current framework, namely under the particular
social group category of United States immigration law. After
analysis under current law, this Note proposes a judicial resolution
explicitly recognizing particular social groups such as “women
from [country].” Next, a statutory of regulatory amendment is
suggested that unequivocally allows for asylum claims on the basis
of gender or sex. Additionally, prosecutorial discretion is analyzed
as an avenue of quick and efficient change to immigration
enforcement. Next, this Note proposes a series of general
immigration law changes that would indirectly address
gender-based asylum. This Note suggests that a “hard look”
standard of review be adopted for immigration cases in appellate
courts, departing from the current, highly deferential “substantial
evidence” and Chevron17 reviews. Finally, this Note proposes a
public defender program for immigration courts, as well as
removing such courts from the influence of the Department of
Justice.
B. Historical Application
In 1985, the Board of Immigration Appeals (The Board) issued
a decision defining “particular social group” to aid in analyzing
asylum claims.18 The Board determined that a particular social
16. See id. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic
violence . . . will not qualify for asylum.”).
17. See Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[A]
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”).
18. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985) (outlining a guideline
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group is a group of persons who share a common, immutable
characteristic such as sex, color, kinship ties, or even certain
shared past experiences.19 Although this created a very basic and
inclusive framework, the general vagueness that remained still left
inconsistency in the analysis of applicants who claimed
membership in a particular social group.20
For example, in Fatin v. I.N.S.,21 the Third Circuit denied
asylum to an Iranian woman because she did not have a
well-founded fear of persecution.22 Despite this, the Court was
open to the applicant’s suggestion that women in Iran could be a
particular social group.23 Conversely, the same court denied the
claim of an Armenian woman who was kidnapped and trafficked,
stating that a characteristic like gender is too broad to constitute
a claim.24 This highlights the uncertainty and inconsistency that
exists even within a single circuit.25
The ambiguity in particular social group analysis has harmed
many asylum-seekers, perhaps none more than women who have
suffered persecution, with denials ranging from debatable to
especially egregious, as shown in In re R-A-.26 In that case, Rodi
definition for particular social group analysis).
19. See id. at 233 (explaining what constitutes a particular social group).
20. See Plant, supra note 12, at 119 (“That room for judicial interpretation
has led to widely varying application and results.”).
21. See Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the
petitioner, an Iranian woman, was not entitled to withholding of deportation or
asylum).
22. See id. at 1243 (“In sum, whether her argument is couched in terms of
membership in a ‘particular social group’ or in terms of ‘political opinion,’ the
administrative record is insufficient to show that she has a well-founded fear of
persecution.”).
23. See id. at 1240 (“In the excerpt from Acosta quoted above, the Board
specifically mentioned ‘sex’ as an innate characteristic that could link the
members of a ‘particular social group.’”).
24. See Sarkisian v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 322 F. App’x 136, 143 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“But, as we have noted, ‘[p]ossession of broadly-based characteristics such as
youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a
particular social group.’” (citing Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir.
2003))).
25. Compare Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240 (stating that sex could link members of
a particular social group), with Sarkisian, 322 F. App’x at 143 (stating that gender
is too broad to constitute a particular social group).
26. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 927 (B.I.A. 2001) (finding that a
Guatemalan woman’s severe abuse was not on account of membership in a
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Alvarado, a Guatemalan woman who married at age sixteen,
experienced incomprehensible abuse for years at the hands of her
husband.27 He regularly beat her both at home and in public,
dislocated her jawbone when her menstrual period was late,
violently kicked her in the spine when she did not want to abort
the child, kicked her genitalia causing her to bleed severely for
eight days, whipped her with electrical cords, pistol-whipped her,
threw a machete at her, and on several occasions beat her to
unconsciousness.28 He repeatedly raped and sodomized her, beat
her before, after, and during the unwanted sex, and gave her a
sexually transmitted disease.29 He abused her psychologically as
well by telling her stories about killing babies and the elderly
during his time in the army, he threatened to deface her and cut
off her limbs, and he threatened to hunt her down and kill her if
she left.30 He told her his reason for the abuse was because, “You’re
my woman, you do what I say,” and, “I can do it if I want to.”31 After
she attempted suicide on one occasion, he responded, “If you want
to die, go ahead. But from here, you are not going to leave.”32 She
sought help from the police and even appeared in front of a judge,
who brushed off the abuse as a domestic issue.33
Alvarado managed to escape to the United States and apply
for asylum, only to be denied relief from removal.34 The Board of
Immigration Appeals recognized that she suffered harm more than
sufficient to constitute persecution, that her testimony was
credible, and that she was unable to avail herself of the protection
of the Guatemalan government.35 However, the Board denied her
application on the basis that her proposed social group was not an
actual social group.36 Namely, “Guatemalan women who have been
particular social group, and therefore she was ineligible for asylum).
27. See id. at 908–09 (detailing the abuse the asylum applicant suffered).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 909.
33. See id. (“When the respondent appeared before a judge, he told her that
he would not interfere in domestic disputes.”).
34. See id. at 928 (granting the respondent voluntary departure).
35. See id. at 914 (stating that the respondent meets all of the criteria).
36. See id. at 917 (“[W]e find that the respondent’s claimed social group fails
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involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who
believe that women are to live under male domination” was too
abstract to be formally recognized.37 The Board reasoned that it is
unclear whether the proposed group is recognized and understood
to be a societal faction, or whether the abuse suffered was due to
membership in the group.38 In 2009, after a fourteen-year legal
battle, Alvarado was eventually granted asylum, although no
published opinion was issued. 39
Cases like Basova’s and Alvarado’s represent the significant
flaw present in immigration jurisprudence in the United States.
There is a general reluctance and refusal among courts to
recognize valid claims based on gender because of the confusing
framework that currently exists.40 Courts regularly leave
individuals who have exhausted their available remedies to return
to the danger from which they fled.41 In 1995, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service issued a memorandum to assist asylum
officers in making preliminary decisions regarding gender-based
claims, stating that such claims fall within the asylum framework,
but courts continued analyzing particular social groups more

under our own independent assessment of what constitutes a qualifying social
group.”).
37. See id. at 914, 917 (“The determinative issue . . . is whether the harm
experience by the respondent was, or in the future may be, inflicted ‘on account
of’ a statutorily protected ground.”).
38. See id. at 918 (“The respondent has shown neither that the victims of
spouse abuse view themselves as members of this group, nor, most importantly,
that their male oppressors see their victimized companions as part of this
group.”).
39. See Matter of R-A-, U. CAL. HASTINGS, https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ourwork/matter-r-a- (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (providing a timeline of Alvarado’s
legal proceedings) [perma.cc/L2JY-76DX].
40. See Bethany Lobo, Women as a Particular Social Group: A Comparative
Assessment of Gender Asylum Claims in the United States and United Kingdom,
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 361, 363 (2012) (“[T]he United States fails to honor asylum’s
political conception, i.e, to protect this subset of refugees who need surrogate
international protection.”).
41. Cf. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger:
Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 A M.
U. L. REV. 337, 368 (2009) (“However, the Board rejected the asylum claim on
grounds that are likely to continue to plague domestic violence-based asylum
claims until there is a significant change in how gender-based claims are viewed
overall.”).
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narrowly and exclusively.42 In 2000, the Department of Justice
issued a proposed regulation aimed at helping analyze cases based
on violence by non-state actors.43 The Department of Justice stated
that in some cases, domestic abusers are motivated by the victims’
gender or status in a domestic relationship, but ultimately did not
go so far as to guarantee protection in these cases.44 The language
that made it to the regulation was much weaker, only outlining
gender, among other things, as something to be considered that
“may or may not be relevant.”45
Even in cases where the courts came to a favorable result, they
avoided concluding that a broad category based on gender alone
could constitute a particular social group.46 For example, in In re
Kasinga,47 the Board of Immigration Appeals recognized that
female genital mutilation was widespread in Togo and that the
Togolese government took no action against it.48 Rather than
42. See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection at 2, HCR/GIP/02/01
(May 7, 2002) (“Adopting a gender-sensitive interpretation of the 1951
Convention does not mean that all women are automatically entitled to refugee
status.”); see also Melanie Randall, Particularized Social Groups and Categorical
Imperatives in Refugee Law: State Failures to Recognize Gender and the Legal
Reception of Gender Persecution Claims in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 529, 553 (2014) (“[T]he same
troubling classification phenomenon pertains in the U.S. case law with regard to
‘particular social groups,’ which have been continuously defined in narrow and
individualized terms.”).
43. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76588-01 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
44. See id. at 76593 (“Thus, it may be possible in some cases for a victim of
domestic violence to satisfy the ‘on account of’ requirement . . . .”); see also Silenzi
Cianciarulo & David, supra note 41, at 371 (“Although it is useful that the
Department rejected the Board’s strict approach, the proposed regulations fall
short of guaranteeing refugee protection for battered women.”).
45. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3) (2019) (“[A]djudicators should
consider . . . age, gender, health, social and family ties. These factors may or may
not be relevant . . . and are not necessarily determinative . . . .”).
46. See Randall, supra note 42, at 555 (“The definition of ‘particular social
group’ in Kasinga, while representing a positive legal development in the U.S.
context, is nevertheless one that shies away from grappling with gender as a
category in its own right.”).
47. See Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 368 (B.I.A. 1996) (granting asylum to a
member of a Togolese tribe who has not had female genital mutilation performed
on her).
48. See id. at 362 (citing U.S. State Department reports on the practice of
female genital mutilation in Togo).
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accept a particular social group that consisted simply of Togolese
women, the Board layered qualification upon qualification to
determine that the relevant group was “young women of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by
that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”49 The case is recognized
as a step in the right direction, but the Board evaded the heart of
the problem and refused to acknowledge that the practice of female
genital mutilation is the plainest version of gender persecution.50
C. Modern Application
Throughout the years, the Board of Immigration Appeals has
attempted to delineate the requirements for particular social
groups.51 This was largely a result of challenges to the inconsistent
application of the particular social group category. 52 For example,
the Third Circuit stated that the Board would not be entitled to
Chevron deference for “erratic, irreconcilable interpretations of
their governing statutes.”53 As a response, in 2014, the Board
expounded on a “social distinction” requirement, stating that while
a group does not need ocular visibility, it must be perceived as a
group by society generally.54 Further, the Board noted that groups
must be sufficiently particular, explaining that groups must not be
amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.55 It reiterated that
49. See id. at 365 (stating that the particular social group in question meets
all standards).
50. See Randall, supra note 42, at 555 (“The BIA failed to acknowledge that
the persecution existed precisely ‘on account of’ her gender.”).
51. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014) (implementing social
distinction requirements); see also W-G-R-, 26 I&N 208, 222 (B.I.A. 2014)
(cautioning against overbroad social groups).
52. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.
2011) (“Although we afforded the BIA’s interpretation of “particular social group”
Chevron deference in Fatin, this did not give the agency license to thereafter
adjudicate claims of social group status inconsistently, or irrationally.”).
53. See id. (explaining that agencies are not free to generate reckless
interpretations of the statutes they are charged with enforcing).
54. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240 (“Society can consider persons to
comprise a group without being able to identify the group’s members on sight.”).
55. See id. at 239 (“The particularity requirement clarifies he point, at least
implicit in earlier case law, that not every ‘immutable characteristic’ is
sufficiently precise to define a particular social group.”).
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“immutable characteristics” includes characteristics the individual
cannot change or should not be required to change because they
are fundamental to their identities.56 The Board also stated that
“particularity” should be viewed with the specificity that race,
religion, and nationality are viewed, and that the group “must be
defined by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for
determining who falls within the group.”57
Despite the attempts at clarification, courts largely remain
confused about how to perform particular social group analyses.58
For example, within the Arlington Immigration Court alone, the
asylum grant rate between judges varies from nine percent to
eighty-five percent.59 Nationally, the rate varies from zero percent
by Immigration Judge Farrar-Crockett in Atlanta, to ninety-seven
percent by Immigration Judge Bukszpan in New York City.60
Many courts have complained that the “particular social group”
category is difficult to navigate, referring to it as “an enigmatic and
difficult-to-define term.”61 Scholars suggest that the confusion
stems from the Board of Immigration Appeal’s inconsistent
explanations, like requiring defined boundaries on one hand but
56. See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (“The critical requirement is that the
defining characteristic of the group must be something that either cannot be
changed or that the group members should not be required to change to avoid
persecution.”).
57. See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (“[T]he particularity requirement
flows quite naturally from the language of the statute, which, of course,
specifically refers to membership in a ‘particular social group.’”).
58. See Fatma Marouf, Becoming Unconventional:
Constricting the
Particular Social Group Ground for Asylum, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 487, 490–91 (2019)
(“Despite the BIA’s efforts to clarify the meanings of social distinction and
particularity, they remain confusing even for attorneys and are almost impossible
for unrepresented asylum seekers to understand.”).
59. See Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY
2014-2019,
TRANSACTIONAL
RECORDS
CLEARINGHOUSE
(2019),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2019/denialrates.html (last visited
Sep. 6, 2020) (charting asylum grant rates for every immigration judge nationally)
[perma.cc/8D85-CLU5].
60. Id.
61. See Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Over time, the
flexible nature of the common, immutable characteristic test created ‘confusion
and a lack of consistency’ among the judges tasked with adjudicating asylum and
withholding claims.”); see also Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir.
2009) (“Although the other four protected grounds are denoted with a fair degree
of clarity . . . the term ‘particular social group’ is ambiguous.”).
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rejecting well-defined groups because they are large on the other
hand.62 The Board’s guidelines were criticized for their failure to
recognize persecution based solely on gender, particularly in
societies where women are persecuted widely. 63 Although there
have been cases that recognized the possibility of a particular
social group based simply on gender alone, they have failed to
accrue any significant following that could change the landscape of
asylum law in the United States.64
II. The 1951 Convention and the Current State of Immigration
Jurisprudence in the United States
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (to which the U.S. is a party), declared that
human beings should have unassailable rights and set forth
standards for the treatment of refugees.65 The Convention was
drafted in response to the atrocities committed during World War
II, with its concern stemming from the persecution suffered by
Jews and others on the grounds of race, religion, or politics. 66
Notably, the Convention is gender-neutral and neglects to

62. See Marouf, supra note 58, at 491 (“Similarly, the BIA held that social
distinction is based on the view of society as a whole, but in maintaining that
previously recognized PSGs satisfied this standard, it relief on the perspectives
of the persecutors.”).
63. See Bret Thiele, Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee
Law Reform, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 221, 237–38 (2000) (“[T]he particular
social group theory is flawed because it requires the female claimant to
distinguish her persecution as greater than that of the average woman.”).
64. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (disagreeing
with a BIA decision that stated that “all women in Guatemala” could not
constitute a particular social group).
65. See Ivor C. Jackson, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees: A Universal Basis for Protection, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 403, 403 (1991)
(“[I]t should at least be ensured that victims of oppression and persecution obliged
to leave their home country as refugees should be decently treated by the
international community.”).
66. See Andrea Binder, Gender and the Membership in a Particular Social
Group Category of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167,
169 (2001) (“This refugee definition was drafted against the background of the
atrocities committed by Nazi-Germany.”).
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explicitly list gender as a ground for asylum.67 This is a reflection
of a framework “drawn primarily from the realm of public sphere
activities dominated by men,” and does not necessarily account for
certain private oppression that is unique to women.68 Moreover, a
sharp distinction has been drawn between public and private
oppression, signaling an inability to recognize the political, public
nature of oppression such as domestic violence or rape.69 This
distinction coupled with the Convention’s framework ignores the
role that gender plays even in non-domestic, enumerated forms of
oppression like political opinion.70
In 1991, as a response to narrow interpretations of the
Convention leading to gaps in asylum protection, the United
Nations issued guidelines expressly directing countries to adopt
measures that would protect refugee women.71 Again in 2002, the
United Nations reiterated the desire to create a more inclusive
interpretation of the Convention and urged countries to consider
gender-based claims.72 Once more in 2016, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees expressed that women may
constitute a particular social group.73 Countries like Canada, the
67. See Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum
Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 625, 627 (1993) (“[T]his failure to
incorporate the gender-related claims of women refugees is a product of the
general failure of refugee and asylum law to recognize social and economic
rights . . . .”).
68. See Doreen Indra, Gender: A Key Dimension of the Refugee Experience,
6 REFUGE: CAN.’S J. ON REFUGEES 3, 3 (Feb. 1, 1987) (“With regard to private
sphere activities where women’s presence is more strongly felt, there is primarily
silence—silence compounded by an unconscious calculus . . . .”).
69. See Kelly, supra note 67, at 628 (“Refusal of Iranian women to wear the
chador, though a significant form of political protest, is often characterized as a
simple preference for style of dress.”).
70. See Jacqueline Greatbach, The Gender Difference: Feminist Critiques of
Refugee Discourse, 1 INT’L L. J. 518, 520 (1989) (“The bifurcated version of society
itself ignores the realm of women’s lives outside domesticity, and creates a
rhetorical and theoretical wall between domestic and social culture.”).
71. See UNHCR, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, ¶ 3 (July
1991) (“In addition to these basic needs shared with all refugees, refugee women
and girls have special protection needs that reflect their gender.”).
72. See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection, at 2,
HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) (“Adopting a gender-sensitive interpretation of the
1951 Convention does not mean that all women are automatically entitled to
refugee status.”).
73. See UNHCR, UNCHR’s Views on Gender Based Asylum Claims and
Defining “Particular Social Group” to Encompass Gender, at 3 (Nov. 2016) (“It is
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United Kingdom, and Australia have all adopted approaches that
recognize particular social groups on the basis of gender, but the
United States notably lags behind.74
A. Matter of A-B- and Its Implications on Asylum Law in the
United States
While the United States has always had a tumultuous
relationship with immigration, there has been an increased,
visceral reaction to the country’s immigration policies and
practices in the Trump administration.75 In 2018, former Attorney
General Jeff Sessions unilaterally issued a controversial decision
in Matter of A-B-76 overruling Matter of A-R-C-G-,77 a precedential
decision from 2014.78 In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the Board of
Immigration Appeals granted asylum to a Guatemalan woman
who faced shocking abuse from her husband.79 He beat her weekly,
our view that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due
to their having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may
be considered as a ‘particular social group’ . . . .”).
74. See Lobo, supra note 40, at 363 (“The lower U.S. courts rarely recognize
‘women’ as a particular social group; they either deny gender asylum claims or
grant relief via a more narrowly-defined particular social group.”); see also
Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Affs. v. Khawar [2002] HCA 14 (Austl.)
(“The ‘group’ is capable of being properly defined in a principled manner,
specifically by reference to the ground upon which the state concerned has
withdrawn the protection of the law and its agencies.”); see generally Perdomo v.
Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 n.5 (citing Higbogun v. Canada, [2010] F.C. 445 (Can.)).
75. See B. Shaw Drake & Elizabeth Gibson, Vanishing Protection: Access to
Asylum at the Border, 21 CUNY L. REV. 91, 92 (2017) (stating that immigrants
and advocates have been thrust into a state of uncertainty following the election
of Donald Trump).
76. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 346 (AG 2018) (holding that victims of private
violence will not be eligible for asylum and countries’ problems policing certain
crimes does not establish asylum eligibility).
77. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014) (recognizing “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as a cognizable
social group).
78. See Theresa A. Vogel, Critiquing Matter of A-B-: An Uncertain Future in
Asylum Proceedings for Women Fleeing Intimate Partner Violence, 52 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 343, 346 (2019) (“The Attorney General’s decision to overrule Matter
of A-R-C-G- in Matter of A-B- quashed any hope for fairer and more consistent
determinations in asylum cases involving intimate partner violence until new
legislation or regulations are put in place to provide guidance.”).
79. See A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389 (“It is undisputed that the
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broke her nose, threw paint thinner on her which burned her
breasts, and raped her.80 She called the police several times, but
they refused to interfere in a marriage.81 She attempted to flee,
staying with her father and even moving to Guatemala City, but
her husband found her each time and threatened to kill her if she
did not return.82 The Board determined, and the Department of
Homeland Security agreed, that “married women in Guatemala
who are unable to leave their relationship” was a cognizable social
group, finding the respondent eligible for asylum.83 The Board
executed a thorough inquiry, looking to societal norms, country
conditions, and treatment of spousal abuse in Guatemala to bolster
the decision.84
The decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- was not particularly
profound or broad, and did not create a sweeping precedent that
addressed the shortcomings of gender-based asylum claims.85
Nonetheless, Attorney General Sessions stated that the decision
“caused confusion because it recognized an expansive new category
of particular social groups based on private violence.”86 This
characterization of Matter of A-R-C-G- is largely incorrect because
courts overwhelmingly distinguished the case due to its narrow
holding, with only a few applying it in favor of the asylum seeker.87
respondent, who married at age 17, suffered repugnant abuse by her husband.”).
80. See id. (describing the abuse the respondent suffered).
81. See id. (“On one occasion, the police came to her home after her husband
hit her on the head, but he was not arrested.”).
82. See id. (explaining each instance she fled, leading to her leaving
Guatemala altogether).
83. See id. at 395 (“The DHS also concedes in this case that the mistreatment
was, for at least one central reason, on account of her membership in a cognizable
particular social group.”).
84. See id. at 393–94 (“Supporting the existence of social distinction, and in
accord with the DHS’ concession that a particular social group exists, the record
in this case includes unrebutted evidence that Guatemala has a culture of
‘machismo and family violence.’”).
85. See Vogel, supra note 78, at 373 (“Unfortunately, the narrow holding of
Matter of A-R-C-G- allowed adjudicators in subsequent cases to disregard any
guidance the BIA provided in evaluating gender-based asylum claims, in
particular those involving intimate partner violence.”).
86. See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 319 (AG 2018) (“Since that decision, the
Board, immigration judges, and asylum officers have relied upon it as an
affirmative statement of law, even though the decision assumed its conclusion
and did not perform the necessary legal and factual analysis.”).
87. See Vogel, supra note 78, at 373 (“Contrary to Attorney General Sessions’
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Rather, Sessions himself issued a broad, sweeping decision
attempting
to
foreclose
victims
of
persecution
by
non-governmental actors from successfully seeking asylum in the
United States, narrowing an already under-inclusive system.88 The
decision in Matter of A-B- was immediately criticized for the
adverse effect it would have on victims of gender-based violence.89
Sessions was accused of ignoring thirty years of precedent, the
dynamics of domestic violence, and perpetuating “rejected
understandings of intimate partner violence inflicted against a
female partner . . . .”90 Indeed, Sessions’ approach ignores how
domestic violence is treated in the United States regarding its
evolution from a private matter to a matter of public interest with
the passing of the Violence Against Women Act and similar
legislation.91
Among other things, Sessions raised the standard for the
requirement that the government of an applicant’s home country
is “unable or unwilling” to protect the applicant.92 Instead, he
changed it to a requirement that the government “condoned or was
completely helpless” in the matter.93 This approach was contrary
assertions that Matter of A-R-C-G- created confusion, the U.S. circuits courts, the
BIA, and immigration judges predominantly distinguished Matter of A-R-C-G-,
and few adjudicators favorably applied the case for the asylum applicant.”).
88. See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining
to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will
not qualify for asylum.”).
89. See Ruby Robinson, How the U.S. Attorney General Tried (But Failed) to
Stop Domestic-Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 98 MICH. B. J. 30, 31 (2019)
(“A-B- had an immediate adverse effect on all persons seeking protection as
survivors of domestic and gender-based violence as well as their advocates.”).
90. See Vogel, supra note 78, at 374 (“He ignored entirely the underlying
cause of intimate partner violence inflicted against female partners: [G]ender
and subordination, or the abuser’s view that the woman is subordinate to him in
the relationship . . . .”).
91. See id. at 409 (“Despite public awareness in the United States of the
problem of intimate partner violence and substantial progress in federal and state
law combating it, asylum law trails behind by almost fifty years.”).
92. See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337 (“The fact that the local police have not
acted on a particular report of an individual crime does not necessarily mean that
the government is unwilling or unable to control crime, any more than it would
in the United States.”).
93. See id. (“The applicant must show that the government condoned the
private actions "or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the
victims.").
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to precedent, and the cases he cited do not actually recognize or
apply such a standard.94
Matter of A-B- was challenged and abrogated in Grace v.
Whitaker.95 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
determined that the Board of Immigration Appeals was entitled
Chevron deference and held that the Attorney General’s decision
was arbitrary and capricious because “there is no legal basis for an
effective categorical ban on domestic violence and gang-related
claims.”96 However, the District Court’s decision is only in regard
to credible fear determinations, which are initial determinations
made by an asylum officer that only require a “significant
possibility” that an applicant could potentially establish asylum
eligibility before they move on to actual adjudication. 97 Although
Grace v. Whitaker only addresses the credible fear stage, similar
arguments would apply in challenges to asylum adjudications.98
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, like other
courts, evaded the heart of the issue with particular social groups
and affirmed much of Sessions’ reasoning.99 The Court explained
the circular reasoning problem of defining particular social groups
by the harm suffered, using “women who fear being forced into
prostitution” as an example of a group that is not separated from
the harm.100 The Court went on to explain that the specific group
alleged would have to share another common characteristic—such
94. See Vogel, supra note 78, at 398 (“[I]t is inconsistent with Matter of
Acosta, the standard applied in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- upon
which he so emphatically relied.”).
95. See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding
that precluding domestic and gang-related claims is an impermissible reading of
the statute and is arbitrary and capricious).
96. See id. at 126 (“Second, such a general rule runs contrary to the
individualized analysis required by the INA.”).
97. See id. at 126–27 (“The Attorney General’s decision to deny most
domestic violence or gang violence claims at the credible fear determination stage
is fundamentally inconsistent with the threshold screening standard that
Congress established.”).
98. See Vogel, supra note 78, at 379 (“In other words, Grace v. Whitaker dealt
the first blow to Attorney General Sessions’s decision in Matter of A-B-, but the
decision is in the appeal process.”).
99. See Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 905 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (upholding the PSG
requirements of Matter of A-B-).
100. See id. at 903 (“Stated that way, the group is defined by the harm alleged
(forced prostitution).”).
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as being targeted for prostitution because of their political views—
to be valid.101 This line of reasoning came close, but ultimately
failed to see the obvious: The common characteristic the group
shares is the fact that they are women.
Matter of A-B- represents a backwards slide in American
immigration jurisprudence.102 Instead of improving the laws, we
are left patching up a mangled interpretation of them. It is a
transparent attempt at curbing migration from Central and South
America at the expense of legitimate, established laws. 103 It
invokes outdated views of domestic violence and places the United
States further away from honoring its international obligations
under the Refugee Convention.104
B. Progress in the Wake of Matter of A-BFormer Attorney General Sessions’ decision in Matter of
A-B- still leaves open the possibility of an interpretation of asylum
law that includes a broad application of “gender” as a particular
social group.105 Sessions emphasized and outlined key features of
a particular social group analysis: An immutable characteristic;
defined with particularity; and social distinction.106 He used this
framework to determine the social group in Matter of A-R-C-G-—
101. See id. at 903 (explaining that a shared characteristic outside of the harm
alleged is required to avoid circularity).
102. See Fatma Marouf, Becoming Unconventional:
Constricting the
‘Particular Social Group’ Ground for Asylum, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 487, 512 (2019)
(“In the short term, we are likely to see much higher rates of asylum claims
related to domestic violence, which had become accepted under Matter of
A-R-C-G- . . . .”).
103. See id. at 511 (“Policies calling for a ‘border wall’ and stopping migration
from Mexico and Central America go hand-in-hand with these administrative
decisions making it harder for people escaping those countries to obtain asylum
in the United States.”).
104. See id. at 517 (“This backwards slide undercuts the fundamental human
rights protections that these treaties aim to provide and injects ever greater
inconsistencies and uncertainty into our asylum system.”).
105. See id. at 514 (“[F]ormer Attorney General Sessions unintentionally
made some immigration judges more open to consider a much simpler, more
logical version of the PSG that has long been advocated by immigration lawyers
and scholars: [W]omen.”).
106. See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 330 (A.G. 2018) (outlining the necessary
elements of a particular social group).
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“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
relationship,”—was not a cognizable group because Guatemalan
society would likely not view them as a group, and it did not exist
independently from the persecution.107
Under Sessions’ approach, however, a gender-based or a
domestic violence claim could still be successful if the particular
social group is simply and cleverly framed.108 Suggestions have
included formulating particular social groups that “avoid focusing
on harm but combining gender, nationality, treatment of women
as property, or political opinion” to maximize success.109
Unintentionally, Sessions has already caused judges to consider
simple, broad particular social group claims.110 Immigration judges
in at least three different cities, potentially more, have recognized
gender alone as a particular social group since Sessions’ decision,
a sharp contrast from what he intended.111
This handful of decisions has not stoked much optimism,
however. Matter of A-B- still shows a propensity for an already
imperfect system to perform flawed analyses, exhibit misogynistic
reasoning, and harm large numbers of people.112 A path to a more
coherent and just asylum system includes application of the law as
107. See id. at 336 (“By contrast, there is significant room for doubt that
Guatemalan society views these women, as horrible as their personal
circumstances may be, as members of a distinct group in society . . . .”).
108. See Robinson, supra note 89, at 32 (“First, humanitarian relief like
asylum and withholding of removal for survivors of domestic and gender violence
is still available post A-B-.”).
109. See id. at 32 (“Formulations of particular social groups like ‘Guatemalan
women,’ ‘Guatemalan women unable to leave their relationships,’ and
‘Guatemalan women viewed as property’ can be sufficient . . . .”).
110. See Marouf, supra note 102, at 514 (“[F]ormer Attorney General Sessions
unintentionally made some immigration judges more open to consider a much
simpler, more logical version of the PSG that has long been advocated by
immigration lawyers and scholars: [W]omen.”).
111. See id. at 514 (“In at least three asylum decisions issued after Matter of
A-B-, immigration judges in Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Arlington have
done just that, finding that gender alone defined the PSG.”); see also, Deborah
Anker, Federal Bar Association’s 2018 Annual Meeting and Convention (May 18,
2019),
https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Anker_FBAMaterials_2019-pdf.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (sharing immigration court
decisions) [perma.cc/FM9N-K5DT].
112. See Vogel, supra note 78, at 434 (“Matter of A-B- demonstrates that the
flawed analysis, confusion, and inconsistencies in the adjudications of asylum
claims based on intimate partner violence persist.”).
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it is meant to be, regulatory changes addressing the issue of
gender-related persecution, and a uniform understanding of how
these claims will be treated moving forward.113
III. Fitting Gender-Based Asylum Claims in the Current
Framework
As discussed above, asylum applicants must meet several
amorphous requirements to qualify for relief from removal under
the “particular social group” category.114 Applicants must possess
an immutable characteristic, social distinction, and sufficient
particularity to be considered a cognizable social group by
courts.115 In contrast to the prevailing approach taken in the
United States, commentators and even some courts recognize that
gender-based asylum claims meet all of the requirements.116 An
approach that embraces gender-based claims has been referred to
as “the only plausible construction” of asylum law.117
A. Immutable Characteristic
The “particular social group” category was introduced as a
mechanism to fill in gaps where asylum claims based on race,
religion, nationality, or political opinion sometimes fell short. 118
113. See id. at 434 (outlining recommendations to resolve issues in the
interpretation and application of the refugee definition).
114. See supra Section II.B (discussing how women easily fit into any
immigrant social group as recognized by U.S. courts yet, nevertheless, those same
courts have refused to recognize gender as a distinct immigrant social group
itself).
115. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014) (describing and
delineating the various requirements in the particular social group category).
116. See Allison W. Reimann, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of
Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1237
(2009) (“More recently, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have recognized
that all of the women of a particular nationality or ethnicity may comprise a
particular social group, at least for claims based on FGM.”).
117. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
social group comprised of Somalian females . . . not only reflects a plausible
construction of our asylum law, but the only plausible construction.”).
118. See Thiele, supra note 63, at 227 (“In introducing this amendment, Mr.
Petren stated, ‘experience has shown that certain refugees have been persecuted
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While the Refugee Convention did not define this term, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook contains a
broad interpretation, requiring simply “similarity of background,
habits or social status.”119 In contrast, U.S. courts, among others,
have required particular social groups to have a certain degree of
immutability that mirrors the other enumerated categories.120
Specifically, particular social groups must be based on an
“immutable characteristic,” which is one that an individual cannot
change or should not be required to change.121 For example, it is
widely accepted that homosexuals are a cognizable social group
that satisfies all requirements.122 On the other hand, a proposed
group consisting of wealthy Guatemalans was considered “too
subjective, inchoate, and variable to provide the sole basis for
membership in a particular social group.”123 Following established
reasoning and caselaw, a gender-based claim is certain to satisfy
any immutability requirement.124
Indeed, it would be difficult to argue that a characteristic such
as gender or sex is one that an individual can or should be forced
to change. These are traits that meet or exceed the immutability
of other enumerated grounds like religion or political opinion, and
because they belong to a particular social group’ and, thus, a category designed to
cover them should be included.”).
119. See id. at 228 (“U.N. and U.S. jurisprudence arrive at differing
interpretations regarding the scope of protection offered by the particular social
group category.”).
120. See W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 213, 213 (B.I.A. 2014) (stating that
particularity should be viewed with the specificity that race, religion, and
nationality are viewed).
121. See id. at 213 (describing the immutability requirement of particular
social groups).
122. See Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Thus, to
the extent that our case-law has been unclear, we affirm that all homosexuals are
members of a ‘particular social group.’”).
123. See Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“If ‘wealth’
defined the boundaries of a particular social group, a determination about
whether any petitioner fit into the group . . . would necessitate a sociological
analysis as to how persons with various assets would have been viewed by others
in their country.”).
124. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE
STATUS 442 (2d ed. 2014) (“In sum, the recognition that a particular social group
can be defined simply on the basis of gender or sex, is . . . ‘simply a logical
application of the seminal reason in Acosta . . . .’” (quoting Regina v. Sec’y of State
for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) 644)).
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courts rarely, if ever, dispute the immutability of gender when
these claims arise.125 The innate, immutable character of a
gender-based group has been defined as “axiomatic” and
embodying an ejusdem generis approach.126 Further, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees issued guidelines in 2002
stating that an immutability standard is sufficient in asylum
analysis and that other standards, like social visibility, only need
to be considered when immutability cannot be established. 127 In
fact, these guidelines specifically use women as an example of a
particular social group under the immutability standard, stating,
“It follows that sex can properly be within the ambit of the social
group category, with women being a clear example of a social
subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who
are frequently treated differently to men.”128 Although gender
clearly meets an immutability standard, the U.S. approach adopts
other, narrower requirements to establish a successful asylum
claim.129
B. Social Distinction
Prior to the adoption of the social distinction test, in 2005 the
Board of Immigration Appeals introduced a social visibility test,
125. See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The
characteristics of being a ‘young woman’ and a ‘member of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe’ cannot be changed.”).
126. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 124, at 436 (“Indeed,
acknowledgment that gender-based groups are clear examples of social subsets
defined by an innate and immutable characteristic are properly within the ambit
of the social group category is now decades old.”).
127. See UNHCR, Guidelines for International Protection: “Membership of a
Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 13, U.N.
Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/02
(May
7,
2002),
https://www.unhcr.org/enus/publications/legal/3d58de2da/guidelines-international-protection-2membership-particular-social-group.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (“If a
claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic determined to be
neither unalterable or fundamental, further analysis should be undertaken . . . .”)
[perma.cc/72EU-6MLF].
128. See id. ¶ 12 (explaining how history and fundamental rights can create
the basis for a particular social group).
129. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 252 (B.I.A. 2014) (discussing the social
distinction requirements).
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which analyzed the visibility and perception of proposed groups in
their respective societies.130 While the United Nations considers
something like visibility an additional ground for asylum claims,
the United States incorporates it as a further limiting
requirement.131 Scholars criticized the social visibility test for
lacking a basis in international law and for potentially harming
victims of sexual or gender-based persecution, like female genital
mutilation, which is oftentimes hidden out of sight.132
Although no one would argue that women do not have social
visibility, this requirement is an impediment because particular
social groups consisting simply of women from a certain country
are not widely accepted in the United States.133 This causes women
to narrow their social groups by including other characteristics
such as family membership, political opinion, education level,
etc.134 For example, Rodi Alvarado defined her social group as
“Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live
under male domination.”135 Under a social visibility standard, this
proposed group falls short, as there are several aspects outside of
her gender that may not be readily recognizable by the general
public in Guatemala.136
130. See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2005) (“The recent Guidelines
issued by the United Nations confirm that ‘visibility’ is an important element in
identifying the existence of a particular social group.”).
131. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in
Defining “Particular Social Group” and its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims
Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 49 (2008)
(“[S]uggesting in an ambiguous and internally inconsistent decision that the
‘protected characteristic’ and ‘social visibility’ tests may now represent dual
requirements in all social group cases.”).
132. See id. at 50 (“Initially, gender-related forms of harm, such as sexual
violence, domestic abuse, female genital cutting, and honor killings were
dismissed as ‘private matters’ that did not constitute persecution.”).
133. See id. at 90–91 (“‘The recognition of gender itself as defining a
[particular social group] has encountered opposition based on a misunderstanding
that it is overbroad and in effect would recognize every woman in certain
countries as refugee . . . .’”).
134. See id. at 91 (“[A]pplicants often define groups in ‘overly complicated and
unnecessarily detailed’ ways . . . .”).
135. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917 (B.I.A. 2001) (“[W]e find that the
respondent’s claimed social group fails under our own independent assessment of
what constitutes a qualifying social group.”).
136. See Marouf, supra note 131, at 97 (“[T]he group is nevertheless likely to
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In response to a lack of practicality in this approach, courts
developed a social distinction requirement.137 Courts reiterated
that ocular visibility is not required, but the analysis requires
courts to look at whether a proposed group would be considered a
group by society.138 Even under this softer approach, the social
distinction requirement may “paradoxically demand that
[marginalized groups] be recognized by the very people who have
denied or suppressed their identities.”139 Critics expressed concern
about the discretion this affords adjudicators given that social
perception is not a rigid, static quality and requires analysis that
may be outside of the judges’ expertise. 140 While a category
consisting only of women from a certain country would meet the
standard, disregarding the social distinction test would simplify
the asylum analysis, particularly in the United States where
women are forced to qualify their proposed social groups with
various other characteristics.141
C. Particularity
The particularity requirement adds another hurdle for asylum
applicants to overcome.142 This requirement attempts to delineate
fail the BIA’s social visibility test because the general population in Guatemala
would not automatically recognize which women are married and unable to leave
their relationships.”).
137. See, e.g., W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 216 (B.I.A. 2014) (“We now rename
that requirement [previously social visibility] ‘social distinction’ to clarify that
social visibility does not mean ‘ocular’ visibility . . . .”).
138. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing that
the requirement is a question of whether the society in question would recognize
the group as a discrete class of persons).
139. See Marouf, supra note 131, at 105 (explaining the difficulties of a social
visibility approach).
140. See id. at 106 (“In short, the ‘social visibility’ test effectively gives
decision-makers total discretion to decide whether or not a particular social group
exists.”).
141. See id. (“Embracing the BIA’s new approach will not only lead to chaotic
case law and abdication of the United States’ obligations under the convention,
but also will cause the legal community to reject the refugee status determination
as a serious, principled process.”).
142. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 233 (B.I.A. 2014) (stating that the
board was seeking to provide greater specificity to the definition of a social
group.).
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the outer limits of proposed groups, 143 acting as a benchmark to
clearly determine who falls within the group.144 A group must be
“discrete and have definable boundaries—it must not be
amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”145 The Board stated
not every immutable characteristic meets this standard.146 For
example, groups based on wealth, poverty, youth, or homelessness
are considered “too vague and all encompassing” to set the
perimeters of a particular social group.147 Ironically, the Ninth
Circuit, which has shown favorability towards gender-based
asylum claims, stated that major segments of a population will
rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct social group.148
The introduction of this standard, much like other attempts at
delineating social groups, created confusion among courts.149 The
Third Circuit was particularly critical and refused to adopt the
“particularity” standard, stating:
We do not believe that the government is using particularity to
impose a numerical or size limitation on the meaning of
“particular social group.” However, we are hard-pressed to
discern any difference between the requirement of
“particularity” and the discredited requirement of “social
visibility.” Indeed, they appear to be different articulations of
the same concept and the government’s attempt to distinguish
the two oscillates between confusion and obfuscation, while at
times both confusing and obfuscating. Indeed, “Particularity”
appears to be little more than a reworked definition of “social
143. See id. at 238 (“The ‘particularity’ requirement relates to the group’s
boundaries . . . .”).
144. See W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014) (defining particularity).
145. See id. (“A particular social group must be defined by characteristics that
provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group.”).
146. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 239–40 (“[N]ot every ‘immutable
characteristic’ is sufficiently precise to define a particular social group.” (citing
Escobar v. Gonzales, 713 F.3d 363, 383 (3d Cir. 2005))).
147. See id. (clarifying what the particularity requirement seeks to
accomplish).
148. See Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005) (“‘To hold
otherwise would be tantamount to extending refugee status to every alien
displaced by general conditions of unrest or violence in his or her home country.’”
(quoting Sancho-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986)).
149. See Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confusing
Legal Standard for ‘Membership in a Particular Social Group’, 14-06 IMMIGR.
BRIEFING 1 (2014) (stating that the particularity and social visibility requirements
ensures a new round of litigation aimed at restoring simplicity).
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visibility” and the former suffers from the same infirmity as the
latter. The government’s use of “particularity” is inconsistent
with the prior BIA decisions discussed in the “social visibility”
portion of this opinion. We therefore hold that adopting a
“particularity’ requirement is unreasonable because it is
inconsistent with many of the BIA’s prior decisions.150

Further, the Third Circuit denied the Board Chevron
deference because the agency departed from its prior decisions
without stating a principled reason for doing so.151 In fact, after
introducing the “particularity” standard in 2008, the Board did not
recognize a new social group until 2014.152
The uncertainty caused by the Board’s particularity
requirement has led to vastly inconsistent approaches and
applications among courts.153 For example, the Fifth Circuit
rejected a group defined as “Salvadoran males between the ages of
8 and 15 who have been recruited by Mara 18 but have refused to
join because of their principal opposition to the gang and what they
want.”154 The Court determined the proposed group was not
particular enough, stating it was “exceedingly broad and
encompass[ed] a diverse cross-section of society.”155 In contrast, the
Tenth Circuit stated that a group consisting of “Salvadoran women
between the ages of 12 and 25 who resisted gang recruitment” met
the particularity standard.156 However, the proposed group was
150. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011).
151. See id. (explaining that the Board’s departure from precedent was
unreasonable).
152. See Particular Social Group Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum
After Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (Jan.
22,
2016),
https://immigrantjustice.org/for-attorneys/legalresources/file/particular-social-group-practice-advisory-applying-asylum-1 (last
visited Sep. 6, 2020) [hereinafter Practice Advisory] (“In August 2014, the BIA
issued the first published decision recognizing a new particular social group . . .
.”) [perma.cc/V6Z8-SLA8].
153. See Casper et al., supra note 149, at Part III (contrasting various Circuit
Courts’ decisions).
154. See Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The
proposed groups for Jose and Andres do not meet the test established by the BIA,
and we cannot say that the rejection of such a group is arbitrary and capricious.”).
155. See id. (describing that gang recruitment reaches young men of all
backgrounds in El Salvador).
156. See Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012)
(disagreeing with the BIA’s conclusion that the group was not defined with
sufficient particularity).
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rejected in the end because it did not meet the “social visibility”
standard.157
The latter case illustrates a problem that arises in
gender-based claims under the combination of the various
standards. While a proposed social group consisting simply of
women from a particular country undoubtedly has well-defined
boundaries and social distinction, the refusal of courts to recognize
this group forces women to qualify their proposed groups with
other characteristics like relationship status or familial ties, for
example.158 Although particularity and social distinction have
significant overlap, language that a society would use to define a
group (“young women,” for example) is not always language that
would define a group with the requisite legal particularity.159
Inversely, when a group is defined with precision (“women between
the ages of 20 and 25”), there is a challenge in establishing that
society would view that group distinctly from women between the
ages of 26 and 30, for example.160 Critics of the particularity and
social distinction requirements claim they place an immense
burden on asylum-seekers and immigration judges alike, due to
the amount of information it takes to prove country conditions and
the sociological aspect of the analysis required.161 Although purely
gender-based asylum claims meet the particularity standard by
definition, the requirement is too vague and confusing to be
applied with any consistency, leading some courts to reject it
entirely.162
157. See id. at 653 (“The fact that Rivera-Barrientos was targeted thus does
not provide evidence that society perceives her to be a member of a particular
social group.”).
158. See Marouf, supra note 131, at 91 (“[A]pplicants often define groups in
‘overly complicated and unnecessarily detailed ways . . . .’” (quoting MICHELLE
FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 326–28
(2007))).
159. See Practice Advisory, supra note 152, at 5 (“For example, ‘young’ does
not say how young; ‘wealthy’ does not say how wealthy.”).
160. See id. (“Thus, the particularity requirement . . . effectively precludes the
use of common parlance labels to describe a PSG, even as the social distinction
test requires that a PSG be limited by parameters a society would recognize.”).
161. See Casper et al., supra note 149, at Part V (“Not only is this process
onerous on applicants, but it forces judges to evaluate issues outside their
expertise.”).
162. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a
particular social group consisting of “young Albanian women who live alone” can
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IV. Resistance to Broad Gender-Based Claims
Women can satisfy any type of social group test that U.S.
courts can apply.163 Women have immutable characteristics and
are socially distinct.164 Further, as a group, women are
well-defined, and, unfortunately, subject to persecution around the
globe.165 It is a principle of the refugee treaties that all human
beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without
persecution, and there is a need to offer such protection to
women.166 Currently, valid asylum claims can be based on
persecution due to an applicant’s race, nationality, religion, or
political opinion in addition to particular social group. 167 Women
meet or exceed requirements when compared to the
unquestionably recognized enumerated grounds.168 In fact, other
countries have embraced gender-based groups by recognizing that
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion are also extremely
broad traits.169 The United Nations has repeatedly encouraged
countries to recognize the unique plight of women and to accept

constitute a social group).
163. See Sarah Siddiqui, Membership in a Particular Social Group: All
Approaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 525 (2010)
(“U.S. courts all take an approach that applies to women and yields outcomes that
should be favorable to female asylum-seekers.”).
164. See id. at 526 (explaining how women satisfy all PSG requirements).
165. See id. (“Women have a ‘fundamental right to protection from abuse
based on gender . . . .’”) (quoting R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906, 931 (BIA 2001))).
166. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; see Thiele, supra note 63, at 221 (“The
principle that women’s rights are human rights is now widely accepted, at least
at the international level of discourse.”).
167. See infra Part I and accompanying text (establishing that an asylum
seeker must meet the definition of “refugee” under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)).
168. See W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 213, 213 (B.I.A. 2014) (stating that
particularity should be viewed with the specificity that race, religion, and
nationality are viewed).
169. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 124, at 438–39 (explaining Spain’s
resolution of concerns regarding the breadth of the group).
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asylum claims based on gender.170 Many countries have adopted
this approach.171 Notably, the United States has not.172
Although the law, international practice, and common sense
all point to accepting a claim based solely on gender, the pushback
in U.S. courts is based largely on the size of a group consisting of
all women in a country.173 This is a concern about potentially
“opening the floodgates,” and it has been a constant in American
immigration jurisprudence.174 The basic premise of this concern is
that if a category such as “women” is recognized, the United States
will be flooded with claims from individuals merely because they
fall under this broad characterization, not because of actual
persecution.175
The Ninth Circuit articulated this concern in Sanchez Trujillo
v. I.N.S.,176 stating that a class consisting of “young, urban,
working-class males of military age who had maintained political
neutrality” was so broad as to “encompass so many variables that
to recognize any person who might conceivably establish that he
170. See supra Part II (discussing the various guidelines issued by the UN
throughout the years).
171. See generally UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1:
Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 38, U.N.
Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/01
(May
7,
2002),
https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/3d58ddef4/guidelines-internationalprotection-1-gender-related-persecution-context.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2020)
(“UNHCR encourages States who have not already done so to ensure a gendersensitive application of refugee law and procedures . . . .”) [perma.cc/4QUPWBGM].
172. See Lobo, supra note 40, at 363 (“The lower U.S. courts rarely recognize
‘women’ as a particular social group; they either deny gender asylum claims or
grant relief via a more narrowly-defined particular social group.”).
173. See Peter C. Godfrey, Defining the Social Group in Asylum Proceedings:
The Expansion of the Social Group to Include a Broader Class of Refugees, 3 J. L.
POL’Y 257, 280 (1994) (“Group size is perhaps the greatest obstacle to extension of
the ‘particular social group’ to include those who fear persecution on account of
membership in a broadly based group such as gender or sexual orientation.”).
174. See id. (“The concern with allowing an expansive interpretation . . . is
that it will ‘open the floodgates’ to vast demographic divisions of people . . . .”).
175. See id. (“[I]f immigration statutes are so broadly construed as to provide
asylum in such instances, any individual persecuted on account of gender or
sexual orientation may successfully allege an asylum claim . . . .”).
176. Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
class of young, urban, working-class males of military age who had maintained
political neutrality was not a PSG).
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was a member of this class is entitled to asylum and withholding
of deportation would render the definition of ‘refugee’
meaningless.”177 This attitude stems from the fear that if such a
broad group is allowed, individuals who are merely dissatisfied
with social or economic conditions could use a mechanism designed
for bona fide refugees to enter the United States.178
The concern about allowing a broad particular social group
that will open the floodgates to an unmanageable number of
asylum-seekers, while facially logical, is unfounded.179 First, there
is no historical foundation for such a concern.180 Countries that
have adopted an approach recognizing social groups based on
gender have not experienced an inundation of women asylum
seekers.181 For example, in 1993, Canada was the first country to
recognize asylum claims from victims of gender-related
persecution.182 Canada kept track of statistics on gender-based
asylum, and “reported that there was no explosion of claims; to the
contrary, gender claims consistently constituted only a minuscule
fraction of Canada’s total claims, and had actually declined in the
seven-year period following the adoption of the Gender
Guidelines.”183 This result is not paradoxical.184 By their nature,
persecuted groups have limited rights and mobility, constricting
the members’ ability to seek protection.185
177. See id. at 1577 (explaining why a broad social group is unfavorable).
178. See Godfrey, supra note 173, at 280–81 (“Such a construction could be
used to circumvent the narrow selection process used to determine who is a bona
fide ‘refugee’ . . . .”).
179. See Siddiqui, supra note 163, at 527 (“However, this belief—that
adopting the international guidelines and caselaw as models will result in a
substantial rise in the number of female asylum applicants—is unfounded.”).
180. See id. (“History reveals that the acceptance of gender asylum does not
give rise to a deluge of claims.”).
181. See id. (“For example, Canada’s experience corroborates the conclusion
that countries that recognize gender asylum claims do not experience floods of
women refugees.”).
182. See Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of
Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 133 (2007)
(explaining that Canada has kept statistics on gender asylum since its
introduction in the country in 1993).
183. Id.
184. See id. (“There are several explanations why the number of women
asylum seekers has not dramatically increased . . . .”).
185. See id. (explaining the difficulties of seeking asylum for persecuted
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The second reason why the “floodgates” concern is
unwarranted is because there is no real legal basis that allows
courts to legitimize this concern.186 Even U.S. courts have noted
that size and breadth of a group are not determining factors in the
group’s legitimacy.187 Further, the fact that some women may be
able to avoid persecution does not negate the validity of a
gender-based group.188 Membership in a particular social group
alone is not enough to satisfy asylum requirements; applicants
must individually prove that they have suffered harm that rises to
the level of persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution, and that this harm was on account of their
membership in a particular social group, along with certain other
requirements.189 An additional hurdle that comes along with this
burden of proof is that many of these asylum seekers will have very
little physical evidence, and instead will have to rely on the asylum
adjudicators’ assessments of the applicants’ credibility.190 Because
immigration proceedings are administrative hearings, many
asylum seekers appear pro se and therefore may not know how to
testify in a manner that persuades an immigration judge.191
A third reason why the refusal to recognize gender as a
valid asylum claim lacks merit is the effect on judicial economy and
the “constant re-litigating” of claims that results from overly

groups).
186. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 126, at 440 (“It is not a phenomenon
generally found in respect of other Convention grounds, nor does it tend to arise
in respect of other applications of the social group category.”).
187. See Alvarez Lagos v. Barr, 927 F.3d 236, 253 (4th Cir. 2019) (stating that
an immigration judge’s determination that a group was not small enough to
establish a PSG was legally incorrect).
188. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 126, at 441 (“[N]or is the fact that
some women in the relevant group are able to avoid persecution an ‘answer to
treating women . . . as a relevant social group.’” (quoting Regina v. Sec’y of State
for the Home Dep’t [1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) (644))).
189. See id. (“All other elements of the definition, must of course, be
satisfied.”).
190. See Helen P. Grant, The Floodgates Are Not Going to Open, But Will the
U.S. Border?, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 22–23 (2006) (explaining the evidentiary
burdens of asylum seekers who are fleeing domestic violence).
191. See id. at 22 (“[T]he applicant has generally fled her country of origin
without much thoughtful planning and in total ignorance of what will be required
to persuade the U.S. asylum adjudicator that she should be afforded protection.”).
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specific gender-based groups.192 This leads to a social group
analysis that “degenerates into an ‘obstacle course in which the
postulated group undergoes constant redefinition.’”193 Currently,
social group analysis that is based around gender is often a
pedantic evaluation of minutiae, when in reality the persecution
faced by applicants is simply on account of their gender.194 Scholars
claim this creates an impediment for women seeking asylum and
raises issues of gender equality because gender claims are
disproportionately evaluated under intense scrutiny.195
V. Proposal
In order to resolve the shortcomings of gender-based asylum
jurisprudence, this Note first proposes a judicial resolution to
simplify what has become an inconsistent, inequitable, and
incorrect application of asylum law in the United States. This
requires a definition of “particular social group” that clearly
encapsulates asylum claims based plainly on gender, along with
the explicit recognition that gender-based groups are valid. Next,
a statutory or regulatory amendment is suggested to include
gender as a cognizable ground upon which to apply for asylum.
Additionally, prosecutorial discretion by the Department of
Homeland Security is suggested as an effective and immediate way
to alleviate the issue at hand. Next, more general changes are
suggested, such as a re-examination of the standards of review
given to immigration courts, as well as an enactment of a public
defender program for those courts.

192. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 126, at 442 (describing the constant
re-litigation of claims as an especially pernicious concern of overly specific
gender-based groups).
193. Id. (quoting Liu v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 1 WLR 2858
(AC) 2864 [12]).
194. See id. (“[D]ecision-makers and advocates engage in ‘nitpicking around
the margins of the definition,’ when in truth the reason for an applicant’s risk is
simply her membership in the social group ‘women.’” (quoting Liu v. Sec’y of State
for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 1 WLR 2858 (AC) 2864 [12])).
195. See id. (“[R]aises questions of gender equality given that it is
disproportionately gender-based claims that are subjected to such scrutiny and
re-litigation.”).
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A. Judicial Resolution

Purely gender-based asylum claims are not without precedent.
In Matter of Acosta,196 the Board of Immigration Appeals noted
that “particular social group” was undefined by Congress or the
Refugee Protocol, but explicitly listed “sex” as an example of a
characteristic on which a social group is based.197 The Board came
to this determination by construing the term “particular social
group” in a manner consistent with the more specific, enumerated
grounds for asylum.198 In fact, even the Supreme Court of Canada
adopted the Acosta approach because of how well it reflected the
spirit and purpose of the Refugee Convention.199
In the United States, courts lack a defining guideline and new,
binding precedent to offer protection to qualified female
asylum-seekers. Ideally, the U.S. Supreme Court could
unequivocally rule that gender is a valid particular social group
per se. Although the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari for
asylum cases, there are countless eligible cases that flow to the
Federal Courts of Appeals each year.200
A more realistic approach is for the Appellate Circuits to adopt
a definition of particular social groups along with the recognition
that gender-based claims are facially valid. Courts should embrace
an enhancement to their current definitions of particular social
group that explicitly states, “Traits such sex or gender are
prototypical examples of valid characteristics upon which
particular social groups are based.” This would be a minor addition
196. See Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (establishing that
persecution on account of a particular social group is directed toward individuals
with common, immutable characteristics).
197. See id. at 232–34 (“The shared characteristic might be one such as sex,
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past
experience . . . .”).
198. See id. at 232 (“Thus, the other four grounds of persecution enumerated
in the Act and the Protocol restrict refugee status to individuals who are either
unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required,
to avoid persecution.”).
199. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 126, at 427 (“[I]t takes into account
the ‘general underlying themes of the defense of human rights and
anti-discrimination that form the basis for the international refugee protection
initiative.’” (quoting Att’y Gen. v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 736–38 (Can.))).
200. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (remanding a case to the
BIA to determine if family membership constitutes a PSG).
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to the current language that defines groups based on
characteristics the applicant cannot or should not be forced to
change.201 For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
taken a lead on this issue, recognizing all women within a country
as a cognizable social group.202 Since 2010, the Ninth Circuit has
remanded decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals that
rejected gender-based groups as overly broad.203
B. Statutory Amendment/Regulation
The most effective way to solidify gender as a legitimate social
group is to amend the current law to include gender-based claims.
The term “particular social group” appears without definition in
both the United States Code and the Code of Federal
Regulations.204 Because “particular social group” is a historically
confusing term, adding a definition that includes gender-based
groups as a prototypical example would provide protection to a
deserving group and clarify an ambiguity in the courts.
Some commentators have proposed adopting a new category
altogether.205 A sixth category encapsulating gender alone, outside
of the particular social group sphere, would eliminate the need to
mold gender-based claims into existing categories. Although a new
category would require a new judicial framework, the new asylum
ground would be a familiar term, not requiring the elaborate
definitions of particular social groups. Further, the United States
would lead the world in this approach, given that most countries

201. See Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir.
2019) (“The shared characteristic uniting the social group ‘must be one that the
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to
change . . . .’”(quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985))).
202. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the BIA’s rejection of “all women in Guatemala” was misguided).
203. See Torres Valdivia v. Barr, 777 F. App’x 251, 252 (9th Cir. 2019)
(determining that the BIA’s rejection of a group consisting of “women from
Mexico” was legally erroneous).
204. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A) (2019); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(2018).
205. See Vogel, supra note 78, at 417 (“First, scholars have proposed that
gender should be a sixth ground for asylum in addition to race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, and particular social group.”).
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have adopted gender as a particular social group, not a separate
group itself.206
The likelihood of such a statutory or regulatory amendment in
the Joe Biden administration is unclear. Biden’s immigration plan
proposes to “modernize” the American immigration system.207
More specifically, Biden promises to restore asylum eligibility for
domestic violence survivors.208 This change would certainly help to
strengthen the asylum claims of many women and reverse some of
the damage done by the Trump administration, but it still falls
short of recognizing women as a group all on their own. Biden’s
immigration proposals do signal a willingness to consider alternate
options, and perhaps the administration would be amenable to a
provision in an immigration reform package that explicitly
protects women across the globe.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law
An often-overlooked area of immigration enforcement is the
role prosecutorial discretion takes in the immigration context.209
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can exercise
discretion, both widely and in specific cases, for a variety of
reasons.210 For example, DHS may decide to refrain from pursuing
actions against certain groups of immigrants to save resources, or
they may decide that certain qualities may redeem an individual
who is otherwise ineligible for removal.211 Further, enforcement
206. See Vogel supra note 78, at 418 (“Moreover, the addition of gender as a
sixth ground for asylum would set apart the refugee definition in U.S. asylum law
from other countries in a very important way.”).
207. See generally The Biden Plan for Securing Our values as a Nation of
Immigrants, BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/immigration/ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2020).
208. See id. (“Department of Justice will reinstate explicit asylum
protections—rescinded by the Trump administration—for domestic violence and
sexual violence survivors . . . .”).
209. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L. 243, 243–44 (2010) (“The concept of
‘prosecutorial discretion’ appears in the immigration statute, agency memoranda,
and court decisions about select immigration enforcement decisions.”).
210. See id. at 244–45 (explaining theories behind the exercise of discretion
by the DHS).
211. See id. at 244–45 (describing various situations where the DHS may
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priorities shift with each presidential administration.212 Under the
Bush administration, DHS focused on workplace and home raids,
but under the Obama administration, the focus was on noncitizens
who enter the criminal justice system.213
Additionally, agency leaders can issue memoranda to guide
the enforcement priorities of the relevant agents.214 This
memoranda can “[designate] categories of persons warranting
special consideration and providing for a scenario-based training
program[].”215 This mechanism can be the most immediate way
gender-based asylum claims are recognized. DHS officials can
issue a memorandum directing the agency to not challenge
proposed particular social groups that consist simply of women
from a certain country. This would be effective, within the bounds
of the law, and infinitely more mild than previous DHS policies
that were adopted, such as intentionally separating families at the
border.216 The DHS under the Biden administration should adopt
a policy of prosecutorial discretion that recognizes and allows
gender-based asylum claims.
D. General Immigration Proposals
The following section will describe generalized proposals to the
immigration system that would indirectly help to solve the issue
presented in this Note. A change to the standards of review, legal
representation, and status of the immigration courts would
improve the immigration system overall, thereby strengthening
the claims of women from across the globe.
exercise discretion).
212. See Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
661, 687 (2015) (describing the areas the Bush and Obama administrations
focused on prosecuting).
213. See id. at 687–89 (outlining the differences between the enforcement
priorities of the two presidential administrations).
214. See id. at 692 (“Over the next year, agency leaders issued a series of
memoranda setting forth positive and negative factors to be balanced in the
exercise of discretion . . . .”).
215. Id. at 692.
216. See generally Cora Currier, Prosecuting Parents—and Separating
Families—Was Meant to Deter Migration, Signed Memo Confirms, THE INTERCEPT
(Sept. 25, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/09/25/family-separation-bordercrossings-zero-tolerance/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) [perma.cc/Z5L8-K7SX].
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1. Standard of Review

A hurdle and potential area for effective judicial change is the
highly deferential standards of review that appellate courts afford
the immigration courts. A stricter standard of review, coupled with
an understanding that gender-based asylum claims are the most
reasonable application of the law, would ensure that immigration
courts faithfully apply the law. Currently, questions of fact—
including mixed questions of fact and law—receive “substantial
evidence” review, while interpretations of immigration statutes
receive Chevron deference.217 Asylum adjudication at the agency
level is notoriously backlogged, short on resources, and each
individual judge is encumbered with a 700 case-per-year quota.218
This leads to significant disparities in immigration decisions, with
asylum grant rates deviating by more than fifty percent between
similarly situated applicants.219 Notably, in 2005 Judge Richard
Posner levied a scathing criticism of the immigration courts,
stating that the tension between judicial and administrative
adjudicators is due to administrative decisions falling below the
minimum standards of legal justice.220 Judge Posner’s frustration
stemmed from the fact that in the preceding year, forty percent of
decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals were reversed by
the Seventh Circuit, compared to just eighteen percent in civil
cases.221 This figure is particularly striking due to the deferential
standards of review given to agency findings.
217. See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (establishing that
substantial evidence review is appropriate in immigration cases); see also, I.N.S.
v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (stating that Chevron deference is
afforded to the agency’s construction of the statute which it administers).
218. See Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 581, 585 (2013) (“[R]ecent studies that have cast doubt on
the agency’s competence and expertise, including the shortage of resources and
time for immigration judges to adequately consider each case . . . .”).
219. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 328 (2007) (“[W]e are primarily concerned
with court-wide grant rates that deviate by more than 50% from the national
average grant rate for any of these countries.”).
220. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the
minimum standards of legal justice.”).
221. See id. at 829 (expounding on the high rate of reversal in immigration
cases).
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Enacting a stricter standard of review is a path appellate
courts should take to ensure that immigration courts are
accurately adjudicating claims, especially in light of the difficulties
faced by immigration judges. Interpretations of particular social
groups are issues of law, and therefore receive Chevron deference.
When courts are applying Chevron deference, they can successfully
hold that a rejection of a gender-based social group is not a
reasonable construction of the agency’s statutes. 222 Courts can
conduct an analysis—not dissimilar to the one performed by this
Note—that looks to precedent, international standards, and
common sense to reach the conclusion that the current
interpretation is unreasonable. After the Ninth Circuit held that
the denial of a gender-based group was legally erroneous, the
opinion was never successfully challenged and remains good
law.223 Although this approach has been successful for the Ninth
Circuit, a less deferential standard of review would bolster asylum
seekers’ claims by allowing appellate courts to more closely review
all of the surrounding facts and circumstances of an applicant’s
claim.224 This is imperative even if gender-based claims are
accepted, because the stricter standard of review would be
beneficial in analyzing immigration courts’ reasoning of
individualized factors, such as the applicant’s persecution and
whether it was on account of their membership in the proposed
group.225
Illustrative of this point is the Second Circuit’s
characterization of the “substantial evidence” standard in 2003.226
The Court described “substantial evidence” as slightly stricter
than a “clear error” standard.227 In the eight subsequent
222. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the BIA’s rejection of “all women in Guatemala” was misguided).
223. See Martinez-Mefia v. Barr, 2020 WL 5054885, at *1 (9th Cir. 2020)
(applying the tested used in Perdomo).
224. See supra Section V.A.1 (arguing a stricter standard of review would
ensure the law is faithfully applied).
225. See supra Part IV (arguing that gender-based claims fulfill social group
tests applied more broadly); see also supra Part V.A.1 (arguing a stricter standard
of review would ensure the law is faithfully applied).
226. See Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining the
substantial evidence standard of review).
227. See id. (“Substantial evidence review in the immigration context is
‘slightly stricter’ than the clear-error standard that the circuit courts typically
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immigration cases where this stricter standard was applied, six
were reversed.228 Additionally, courts have seemingly already
applied a stricter standard of review to other agencies.229 Scholars
state that courts have applied a “hard look” review to certain EPA
and NLRB decisions, resulting in a reversal rate of forty-six
percent in these cases.230 An agency’s expertise is the principle
reason for applying deferential standards, but given the lack of
resources in immigration courts and the fact that immigration
cases can make up to forty percent of an appellate court’s docket,
the expertise of the two adjudicative bodies is not significantly
disparate.231
Further, the “substantial evidence” standard is fairly
malleable, giving courts the ability to articulate a standard that
results in a more comprehensive review of the immigration courts’
decisions.232 For example, various agencies have defined the
standard in different ways, ranging from “less than a
preponderance” to a “reasonable minds” review.233 This flexibility
would allow appellate courts to outline a standard of review that
resembles a “hard look,” and operates as more than a mere
rubberstamp of agency decisions.234 Although the particular social
group analysis receives Chevron deference as discussed above, a
change to the standard of review for issues of fact will further
strengthen gender-based asylum claims, albeit indirectly.
apply in reviewing a district court’s factual findings . . . .”).
228. See Kim, supra note 218, at 592–93 (“In six of the eight cases, the court
reversed the IJ’s factual findings. This reversal rate of 75% is remarkably high.”).
229. See id. at 644 (“Moreover, courts appear to be applying hard look review
to other agencies, which provides precedent for the stricter review standard
articulated in immigration.”).
230. See id. (“Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein have argued that courts
appear to be applying hard look review when applying the substantial evidence
and arbitrary and capricious standards.”).
231. See id. at 633 (“In 2005, close to 40% of the Second Circuit’s docket was
immigration cases. The Ninth Circuit was not far behind.”).
232. See id. at 640 (“Courts have iterated the substantial evidence standard
in a variety of ways in a variety of contexts.”).
233. See id. at 640 (describing the various ways differing bodies have defined
the substantial evidence standard).
234. See Tae-Hyun Kim supra note 218, at 585 (“[R]ecent studies that have
cast doubt on the agency’s competence and expertise, including the shortage of
resources and time for immigration judges to adequately consider each
case . . . .”).
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2. Legal Representation
In immigration proceedings, applicants are not entitled to
legal representation.235 However, local and state governments can
allocate funding to provide free or low-cost attorneys to individuals
in immigration courts.236 In 2013, New York City unveiled the New
York Family Unity Project, funded by the City Council and aimed
at providing representation to immigrants appearing in the city’s
immigration courts.237 Before the program, detained immigrants
who did not have a lawyer faced removal at a rate of ninety-seven
percent.238 In the first three years of the program, the removal rate
dropped to fifty-two percent.239
Although immigration proceedings are administrative
hearings, asylum claims are often matters of life and death.240 A
public defense program for immigrants would be an improvement
for immigration hearings generally, and victims of gender-based
persecution would be beneficiaries. Even if courts were to accept
gender as a valid basis for a particular social group,
asylum-seekers would face far better odds with an attorney
crafting their case and dealing with the intricacies of a niche area
of the law.241 The importance of representation was noted by Chief
Judge Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit in 2012, who said,
235. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (ensuring right to attorney in all criminal
trials).
236. See infra note 237 and accompanying text (describing New York’s success
with a project “that provides pro bono lawyers for detainees.”).
237. See Mazin Sidahmed, Opinion, ‘It’s Like an Automatic Deportation if You
Don’t
Have
a
Lawyer’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
13,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/opinion/facing-the-injustice-ofimmigration-court.html (last visited Sep. 6, 2020) (describing the New York
Family Unity Project) [perma.cc/F4UH-97B4].
238. See id. (“97 percent of detained immigrants who lacked a lawyer were
being deported.”).
239. See id. (“The rate of success–defined as the immigrant’s being allowed to
stay in the United States–had risen by 1,100 percent.”).
240. See Nicole Acevedo & Adiel Kaplan, Hundreds deported from U.S. to El
Salvador have been killed or abused, new report says, NBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/hundreds-deported-u-s-el-salvador-havebeen-killed-or-n1126906 (last visited Sep. 6, 2020) (describing Human Rights
Watch report stating that 138 people deported to El Salvador have been killed,
while 70 more have been seriously abused) [perma.cc/5A4A-H3B3].
241. See Sidahmed, supra note 237 (stating that immigrants with
representation were eleven times more likely to have a successful claim).
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“In all too many cases, I had the sense that if only the immigrant
had competent counsel at the very outset of immigration
proceedings, the outcome might have been different, the noncitizen
might have prevailed.”242
Cities in which immigration courts are located should enact
programs to provide counsel to the immigrants appearing before
their adjudicative bodies. The success of the program in New York
serves as an incentive, and basic notions of justice all but demand
it.
3. Status of the Immigration Courts
Another general improvement that would benefit immigration
adjudication in the United States broadly is to remove the courts
from the executive branch and assign them as Article I courts.
Currently, immigration courts operate under the Department of
Justice and the Attorney General, raising questions about the
impartiality of immigration judges.243 Although asylum denial
rates increased toward the end of the Obama administration, they
have exploded under the Trump administration, rising from fifty
percent in 2015 to sixty-nine percent in 2019.244 The total number
of asylum cases decided also rose significantly, from 19,779 in 2015
to 67,406 in 2019.245 The push by the Trump administration to
decide a record number of cases along with the hardline stance
taken on immigration (such as Matter of A-B-) are reflected in
these numbers.246
242. Id.
243. See Leonard Birdsong, Reforming the Immigration Courts of the United
States: Why is There No Will to Make it an Article I Court?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 17,
19 (2013) (“This method of judicial appointment has always appeared to me to
create a conflict of interest.”).
244. See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, RECORD NUMBER
OF
ASYLUM
CLAIMS
IN
FY
2019
fig.
1
(2019)
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/588/ (last visited Sep. 6, 2020) (charting
immigration court asylum decisions between 2001 and 2019) [perma.cc/HHM64B7K].
245. Id.
246. See Kate Smith, Asylum denial rates hit record-high in 2018 as Trump
administration
tightens
immigration
policy
(Dec.
4,
2018),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/asylum-seekers-asylum-denials-hit-record-highin-2018-as-trump-administration-tightens-immigration-policy-as-the-caravan-
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To soften the influence the executive branch can have over
immigration courts, proposals have been made to transform the
courts into Article I courts, like the Bankruptcy Court or Tax
Court.247 This change would afford the immigration tribunals a
degree of independence and an identity that is separate from the
President’s or the Attorney General’s.248 Judges would have fixed
terms of office, more autonomy to control their dockets, and
liberation from the bureaucracy present in the immigration courts
today.249 This proposal has gained support among many scholars
and organizations, including the Federal Bar Association.250
VI. Conclusion
Immigration adjudication in the United States is deeply
broken. A refugee framework that was created and adopted to
protect human beings from atrocities has been mangled and
misapplied, leaving countless individuals abandoned in its wake.
The current application of asylum law in the United States has
strayed from the humanitarian aspirations of the Twentieth
Century, opting instead to close the door and close its eyes on the
suffering from which it once sought to offer shelter.
A judicial or legislative framework that accepts gender as a
basis for asylum claims is an essential step in ensuring that women
suffering harm are able to seek the protection to which they are
entitled. This, along with a stricter standard of review in appellate
courts, a guarantee of legal representation, and independence of
the immigration courts will provide the base needed to effectively
arrives/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (describing reasons for the rise in decisions
and denials) [perma.cc/H7CK-5SJ9].
247. See Birdsong, supra note 243, at 42 (“The next most cited suggestion for
immigration is to transform the immigration courts into an Article I legislative
court.”).
248. See id. at 43 (“Although the judges on these courts lack life-time tenure,
such courts provide a modicum of independence and transparency that is missing
from the EOIR based immigration courts.”).
249. See Elizabeth J. Stevens, Making Our Immigration Courts Courts, 65
FED. LAW. 17, 17–18 (2018) (“[A]s we look to implement changes in our current
immigration system, we must also aspire to lift the immigration courts from
‘halfway there’ not-quite-courts to true Article I courts.”).
250. See id. (stating that the Federal Bar Association’s position is that
immigration courts should be Article I courts).
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and properly decide women’s asylum claims. The proposals in this
Note, however, are merely guideposts. A new understanding of the
unique nature of gender persecution and its role in public and
private spheres is the final step necessary to ensure that these
claims are adjudicated accurately and equitably.
The legislative, executive, and judicial branches all have the
power to enact change necessary to begin applying immigration
law correctly and consistently. No progress can be made without
official action. The United States is commonly referred to as a
nation of immigrants, but it has been countries such as Canada,
the United Kingdom, and Australia that have opened the door to
asylum claims of women.251 It is time for the United States to glow
a world-wide welcome to the tempest-tost masses, yearning to
breathe free.252

251. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing how other countries
created gender-based asylum claims).
252. See EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883) (“From her beacon-hand
glows a world-wide welcome . . . . Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I
lift my lamp beside the golden door!”).

